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II. THE CASES FOR AND AGAINST
FREE TRADE
The Case for Free Trade
JAMES R. HOLBEIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
A quiet revolution has been taking place in the Western Hemi-
sphere while our attention has been focused on the dramatic events in
the former Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe, in the Persian Gulf, and
elsewhere. That revolution takes the form of similar movements to-
ward democratically elected governments and free market economies
throughout the Western Hemisphere. United States foreign and eco-
nomic policies toward that region are designed and intended to facili-
tate the trends already occurring, and will help define how we and our
neighbors live together at the outset of the twenty-first century.
I will briefly review our argument for the policy in favor of freer
trade. I will then describe the various components of United States
trade and commercial policy toward the countries of the Western
Hemisphere, including a report on progress toward implementation of
the United States/Canada Free Trade Agreement, a brief discussion
of the reasons and prospects of the negotiation of a North American
Free Trade Agreement, and then an overview of the President's En-
terprise for the Americas Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Initiative,
and the Andean Trade Initiative. Finally, I will say a few words
about the implication of those regional trade initiatives for the future
of the multilateral trading system, particularly for the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade.
* James R. Holbein is the Acting Director, Office of Latin America, United States
Commerce Department. He is responsible for trade policy and business counseling/export
promotion for all of Latin America and the Caribbean countries except Mexico. He is also the
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review systems for settlement of disputes under the Agreement. In 1988, he was the Mexico
Division Director for the Department of Commerce, supervising negotiations with Mexico
concerning trade and investment policy. He developed several policy studies now serving as
the basis for NAFTA talks with Mexico. Mr. Holbein received his B.A. degree from the
University of California at Santa Barbara, and a J.D. from the University of Arkansas.
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II. PROSPERITY THROUGH FREE TRADE
The process of economic integration and trade liberalization is
accelerating throughout the world, particularly in western and eastern
Europe and in the Pacific Rim. The major nations of the world are
becoming more and more closely tied through trade, investment, and
capital transfers. Countries that do not seize the opportunities opened
up by these changes are in danger of being left behind. Those that do
are able to deliver rising standards of living to their citizens. Disman-
tling barriers to trade and investment increases trade, which in turn
spurs economic growth, productivity gains, and job creation. Busi-
nesses benefit from predictable rules of doing business across their
borders. Consumers benefit from lower prices and a greater variety of
products. Businesses and all trading partners realize gains in effi-
ciency. The bottom line is enhanced competitiveness for goods and
services traded from liberalized economies in the global marketplace.
Expanding world trade also means greater prosperity for all.
This lesson has never been more apparent for the United States than
in the last few years when we have seen United States sales to foreign
markets rebound. Export expansion has become a vital source of
growth for the United States economy, accounting for 40% of United
States economic growth since 1986. Last year, as our domestic econ-
omy slowed down, the $400 billion in exports to the world account for
almost 90% of our GNP growth. It is clear that exporting is becom-
ing an increasingly important engine of growth and prosperity for our
economy. Freer trade translates into more jobs. It is estimated by the
Economic and Statistics Administration that in 1990, each $1 billion
in merchandise trade exports generated or supported 19,100 United
States jobs. United States exports supported 17.2 billion jobs in 1990,
nearly one in six of our manufacturing jobs. United States exports to
Canada alone supported 1.6 million of our jobs here in this country.
Latin American and Caribbean markets are also extremely important
to United States employment. United States merchandise exports to
Latin America and the Caribbean reached nearly $54 billion in 1990,
up $23 billion since 1986. These exports supported over one million
United States jobs. Latin America is our fasting growing export mar-
ket. United States exports to the region have grown by 73% since
1986. Exports to Mexico alone have grown at an average annual rate
of 22% since 1987.
With this brief overview of some of the benefits of freer trade, I
would like to describe the various efforts by the United States govern-
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ment in the Western Hemisphere to achieve these goals. I begin with
the United States/Canada Free Trade Agreement, the model which
will be used to negotiate freer trade with Latin America. An under-
standing of its terms will put into perspective the direction of our
efforts.
III. UNITED STATES/CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
On January 1, 1989, we realized a truly historic achievement
when the United States/Canada Free Trade Agreement ("CFTA")
entered into force. The CFTA is a good deal for both countries - the
proverbial win/win proposition. Both countries will enjoy greater
economic growth, increased trade and investment, greater energy se-
curity, more jobs, lower prices, and greater competitiveness at home
and abroad than they would absent this agreement. The CFTA does
not solve all of our bilateral problems. However, almost every prob-
lem is more amenable to solution with this agreement than without it.
Canada is our largest trading partner. Total bilateral trade in
goods and services was $216 billion in 1990, up from $161 billion in
1987, or a $55 billion increase in just three years.
The CFTA is designed and intended to do three things: (1) to
provide greater market access, (2) to provide more secure market ac-
cess, and (3) to allow market forces to work. You will find these three
themes running throughout the agreement. The CFTA achieves
greater market access because the size of the United States domestic
market is, in effect, expanded by 10%, from 250 million people to 276
million, with the addition of twenty-six million Canadians. Con-
versely, Canada enjoys a 1,000% increase in the size of its domestic
market because twenty-six million have now become 276 million with
the inclusion of the United States market. The CFTA also takes into
account sensitivities on both sides of the border. Canada's concerns
about its sovereignty, cultural heritage, social programs, and separate
identity have all been respected. This is particularly important as we
expand our efforts to negotiate throughout Latin America and the
Caribbean where similar cultural, social, and other sensitivities exist.
Without describing every detail of the agreement, let me give an
overview. All tariffs, without exception, are being eliminated over a
ten year period. Most non-tariff barriers are being reduced or elimi-
nated, and the investment agreement creates a stable and predictable
business environment which has fostered a $25 billion increase in di-
rect investment, fourteen billion flowing from the United States into
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Canada, and eleven billion coming from Canada into the United
States. So, the benefits are mutual. The energy agreement promotes
further deregulation, removes almost all barriers, and assures buyers
and sellers that they can make decisions on future energy supply
based on market considerations. Bilateral trade in energy and energy
products alone exceeds over $10 billion a year. The services agree-
ment covers over 150 service sectors and is the first comprehensive
agreement in the world governing services trade. It embodies four
principles - the principles of national treatment, which means non-
discrimination; the right of establishment, which means the right to
invest in each country as one chooses; transparency, which is basically
the right to know the rules of the game in each country so that busi-
nesses can have the opportunity to meet clear rules as they are estab-
lished; and the right to sell across borders, which means the right not
to invest abroad if one chooses to provide services from one's home
country. New and improved border crossing procedures and visa re-
quirements for temporary business travel and tourism are facilitating
travel back and forth across the border. This is important because
improved trading opportunities are useless unless business people
have access to their markets and customers.
The standards agreement provides that standards related meas-
ures and procedures shall not be used to hinder trade unnecessarily
and that the two countries will work together to foster the harmoniza-
tion of such measures and procedures where appropriate. Some pro-
gress has already been made. For example, six Canadian and six
United States heating and air conditioning standards have been com-
bined into one binational standard, making it easier for companies on
both sides of the border in this sector to compete and sell their prod-
ucts in either country.
The government procurement agreement provides new non-dis-
criminatory access to $500 million worth of Canadian federal pro-
curement, and over $3 billion of United States federal procurement.
These new opportunities have been especially beneficial to small and
medium sized businesses in both countries. Since implementation of
the Canadian agreement over the first three years, 442 Canadian gov-
ernment contracts, totalling over $26 million, were awarded to United
States firms. Without this agreement those opportunities would not
have been open to United States bidders. A similar circumstance is
happening in the United States, although our market for procurement
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was more open to begin with, so it is not as dramatic a change for the
Canadian companies.
Improved customs procedures and new rules of origin assure that
the benefits of the CFTA accrue only to the United States and Canada
because they are the only countries which have undertaken its obliga-
tions. Binational panel review of final anti-dumping and counter-
vailing duty determinations assures that the results of such unfair
trade and practice investigations are made in accordance with domes-
tic law and are fair and impartial. The Binational Secretariat, which I
have been involved with for the past three years, administers the panel
review process. It is functioning smoothly and certainly, from what
we are hearing, both lawyers and companies involved on both sides of
the border, are finding that it is working well and are pleased with the
results to date.
Other CFTA provisions include agriculture, fisheries, cultural in-
dustries, financial services, intellectual property, quantitative restric-
tions, telecommunications, safeguards, wine and distilled spirits, and
automobiles. In summary, the United States/Canada Free Trade
Agreement is an historic achievement that will create vast new trade
and investment opportunities for businesses in both countries. How-
ever, the CFTA can and will be an engine for further economic
growth, new jobs, and lower prices only if the business community is
aware of the changing commercial environment and adopts appropri-
ate business strategies and marketing plans to take advantage of those
opportunities. This is where the legal community can play a tremen-
dous role in assisting business clients to assure that they understand
the obligations of the agreement and can take full advantage of them.
IV. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
On February 5, 1991, the presidents of the United States and
Mexico, and the prime minister of Canada announced their intention
to begin negotiating a North American Free Trade Agreement, the
NAFTA. Successful negotiation of such an agreement would create a
free trade area comprising over 360 million people with a combined
total annual output in excess of $6 trillion.
Let me suggest to you three specific reasons why a trilateral
North American Free Trade Agreement makes good sense for all
three countries. First, a free trade agreement would contribute to
long-term economic prosperity, stability, and growth in Mexico. An
economically prosperous Mexico is important because the lack of eco-
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nomic opportunity is at the root of bilateral problems such as illegal
immigration, drugs, and pollution.
Second, NAFTA would advance the cause of economic reform in
Latin America. The eyes of the region are on Mexico, which is a
leader among Latin American nations. A successful NAFTA could
serve as a model for market oriented policies and reforms elsewhere in
the hemisphere. I am referring specifically to the President's Enter-
prise for the Americas Initiative, which has as its goal the negotiation
of a free trade zone from the Arctic to Antarctica.
Finally, NAFTA makes good business sense. United States busi-
nesses see major trade and investment opportunities in Mexico and
want assured market access. Mexico is our third largest trading part-
ner with two-way merchandise trade estimated at $64 billion in 1991.
You may note that most of these facts were as true six years ago
as they are today. So what has changed to bring us to this day? The
short answer is Mexico itself. In 1986 Mexico joined the GATT and
began a process of reform which continues today. President Salinas,
building on the foundation laid by President de la Madrid, has imple-
mented dramatic, some say stunning, economic reforms. Tariffs have
been reduced to a maximum of 20% ad valorem, well below the 50%
maximum required by Mexico's GATT accession agreement. Many
tariffs used to be as high as 100%. Today, on a trade weighted basis,
Mexico's average tariff on imports from the United States is just
above 10% - about the same level as when Canada initiated free
trade negotiations with the United States.
Import licenses, which were universal as recently as 1983, have
been eliminated for all but 230 tariff line items, representing about 7%
by value of United States exports to Mexico. Investment regulations
were revamped in May 1989 to create a business climate more condu-
cive to foreign direct investment. Intellectual property rights laws
have been enacted which have greatly improved Mexico's level of pro-
tection for patents, trademarks, and copyrights. Privatization of gov-
ernment-owned enterprises have been completed or announced in
many sectors. Of the 1155 state-owned enterprises in 1982, 801 have
been authorized for divestment, and over 600 actually have been
privatized. Banking, airlines, copper mining, telecommunications, in-
surance, and steel are some of the sectors and industries which are
being privatized.
External debt restructuring has been tackled aggressively. Fol-
lowing debt renegotiation under the Salinas administration, Mexico's
[Vol. 15:19
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debt servicing burden has declined, leading to heightened business
confidence and increased capital inflows.
These reforms, and others, when coupled with the free trade
agreement, can be a powerful engine in Mexico for further economic
growth, increased trade and investment, more jobs, lower prices, and
greater competitiveness.
United States, Mexican and Canadian goals in the NAFTA ne-
gotiations are similar to the goals of the United States and Canada
when they initiated CFTA talks. Stated broadly, those are again,
greater market access, more secure market access, and allowing mar-
ket forces to work. The negotiators have carefully examined the pro-
visions of the CFTA and our positions in the Uruguay Round of the
GATT to see which issues are applicable to North American trade
and investment. We have also been consulting and are continuing to
consult extensively with Congress and the United States private sec-
tor, its business, industry, labor and agriculture, seeking their views
on what our specific negotiating goals should be.
Based on their advice, principal United States negotiating objec-
tives include the following: (1) phased elimination of all tariffs; (2)
rules of origin which are predictable, transparent, and simple to ad-
minister; (3) elimination of duty remission, duty drawback and duty
avoidance programs; (4) improved customs procedures and border in-
frastructure to facilitate the flow of goods among the partner coun-
tries; (5) elimination of non-tariff barriers and performance
requirements, such as import licenses, local content and export per-
formance requirements; (6) an investment agreement that will create a
stable and predictable business environment, essential to attracting
and holding long term capital investment; (7) comprehensive intellec-
tual property rights protection and enforcement; (8) a globally com-
petitive North American automotive industry, free of government
imposed trade and investment restrictions; (9) increased access to
each other's government procurement markets, including federal,
state and provincial, local and municipal, federal corporations, and
government controlled or regulated enterprises; (10) a services agree-
ment which embodies the principles of, again, national treatment,
right of establishment, transparency and the right to sell across bor-
ders; (11) improved border crossing procedures to facilitate the move-
ment of temporary business travelers, shoppers, and tourists; (12)
harmonization of standards related measures and procedures to pre-
clude their being used as trade barriers; and (13) an effective dispute
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settlement mechanism and safeguards to assure that firms and work-
ers have adequate time to adjust changing competitive conditions, and
that the transition to free trade is gradual, with no abrupt changes in
existing patterns of employment, investment, production or trade.
These are some of the goals which business, industry, labor, and agri-
culture have already told us they would like to see the three govern-
ments pursue. You will note that their suggestions closely tract the
provisions of the CFTA I outlined earlier.
Since the NAFTA negotiations were launched last June, some
nineteen trilateral working groups, dealing with all of the issues out-
lined above, have been working to craft an agreement. The groups
spent last summer and fall organizing their work, exchanging infor-
mation and setting out issues. At the third trilateral ministerial meet-
ing last October, the trade ministers decided that the time had come
to put pen to paper in most areas and begin drafting and exchanging
text of various parts of the NAFTA agreement. Following consulta-
tions with the Congress and the private sector, United States texts
were shared with Mexico and Canada beginning in late November.
Having exchanged texts in most areas by the end of December 1991,
the three sides met in early January 1992, to develop a composite,
bracketed negotiating text. The process of developing a composite
text helped to determine points of divergence and convergence within
the three national texts. There were hundreds of brackets in the com-
posite text, reflecting the differences remaining.
We recently held a week long series of meetings in Dallas com-
prising all nineteen negotiating groups, as well as the chief negotia-
tors. The purpose was to make as much progress as possible in
removing brackets from the text and narrowing the remaining differ-
ences. We are assessing the results of the Dallas meeting. Work will
continue at the negotiating group level to fulfill the mandates from
Presidents Bush and Salinas and from Prime Minister Mulroney to
complete a good agreement as soon as possible. We will not sacrifice
substance for speed.
The United States is negotiating NAFTA under the fast track
provisions provided by the Congress. The fast tract is important be-
cause it means that Congress must approve or disapprove the entire
agreement with a single up or down vote without amendment, and
has specific time periods in which to do that. Without fast track, the
President cannot assure our negotiating partners that the deal they
strike with us will be the one voted on by Congress. Indeed both
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Mexico and Canada told the United States that without that assur-
ance they would not even enter into negotiations with us on NAFTA.
The President's fast track authority will expire on June 1, 1993, so
that is the outside date by which an agreement must be signed. How-
ever, the fast track authority also requires that the President give the
Congress a minimum of ninety days notice of his intention to enter
into an agreement. As a practical matter, therefore, the outside date
by which we must conclude substantive negotiations is March 1,
1993.
V. ENTERPRISE FOR THE AMERICAS INITIATIVE
On June 27, 1990, President Bush announced his Enterprise for
the Americas Initiative, or the EAI, to encourage growth in the
Americas through initiatives in the areas of trade, investment and
debt. The EAI is the most important foreign economic policy initia-
tive toward Latin America since President John F. Kennedy's Alli-
ance for Progress and President Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor
Policy. Unlike these programs, the emphasis of the EAI is on self-
help. True economic strength for Latin America will come from
trade, not aid, from private investment, not public investment. The
EAI is designed to support Latin American countries in their efforts
to carry out domestic economic reforms and international trade and
investment liberalization. Most of the governments in the region are
making considerable progress in shifting from the old protectionist
status models, economic models of the past, to more open, market
oriented policies. Chile is a good example, but Colombia, Venezuela,
Argentina, and many others are making considerable progress with
their reform programs.
The trade initiative is the first of three components of the EAI
and has as its immediate goal the negotiation of comprehensive free
trade agreements with the countries of Latin America and the Carib-
bean. Since most countries in the region are not yet ready to negotiate
full free trade agreements, President Bush proposed that interested
countries enter into bilateral or multilateral framework agreements
with the United States. Such agreements highlight the benefits from
economic growth of open markets. They provide for the step-by-step
elimination of specific barriers, resolution of bilateral trade irritants,
and establish bilateral councils for trade and investment to discuss the
issues which would arise particularly in trade and investment areas.
These framework agreements lay the groundwork for eventual com-
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prehensive free trade agreements. The President's vision has captured
the imagination of the hemisphere's business and government leaders.
Since the EAI was announced, fifteen framework agreements have
been concluded with thirty countries, leaving only Surinam, Guyana,
Haiti, and Cuba outside this component of the initiative. Council
meetings have been held with all the signatory countries and an ambi-
tious schedule of meetings in 1992 is planned.
The second of the three components is the investment initiative,
which has as its goal the realization of the economic potential of the
region through improvement of the business environment necessary to
attract and hold long-term capital investment. A series of bilateral
investment treaties would be further milestones on the road toward
free trade. In fact, we just recently signed a bilateral investment
treaty with Argentina that is one of the more progressive of such trea-
ties that we have had worldwide, and will be used, more than likely,
as the model for the rest of Latin America. The Inter-American De-
velopment Bank, or the IDB, is playing a positive role toward this
end. The IDB has created a new lending program which will help
countries to liberalize their investment regimes. In return for some of
the liberalization they are getting substantial amounts of capital for
their financial and investment sectors. In a related move, the United
States has proposed that the IDB create a multilateral investment
fund of $1.5 billion to assist countries in carrying out privatization
efforts in programs over the next five years. The multilateral invest-
ment fund agreement was recently signed in Washington, and a
number of countries are participating besides the United States in-
cluding Japan, Germany and several of the countries in the region.
The debt initiative is the third and final EAI component. It pro-
vides support for debt reduction in Latin America, thereby freeing
some of the region's resources to be used for further economic devel-
opment. This is important because United States-Latin American
economic relations are substantial and growing. Two-way trade to-
talled $118 billion in 1990. United States direct investment in the
region exceeds $55 billion, and United States creditors are owed about
$56 billion. An environmental element is included in the debt compo-
nent through environmental framework agreements which create
funds in local currency of interest payments of some United States
debt. These will be used for environmental projects in those coun-
tries. Also, debt for nature swaps are permitted. This element recog-
nizes the importance of environmental protection and conservation to
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sustainable economic growth. We have signed at this juncture three
environmental framework agreements with countries in the region
and several more are under negotiation.
It is important to emphasize that the EAI is a long-term proposal
- there are no quick fixes. The ultimate success of the EAI rests on a
joint commitment by all of the Western Hemisphere countries to col-
laborate in reaching the long term goal of hemisphere-wide free trade.
The United States does not seek to create an inward-looking trading
block, but rather an expanding network of trade creating agreements,
each of which can be viewed as a milestone on the road to a multilat-
eral shared goal of global freer trade.
VI. CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE
On August 5, 1983 President Reagan signed the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act, which created the Caribbean Basin Initia-
tive, or CBI. It is a program of trade and investment which ushered
in a new era in the United States' relations with twenty-three desig-
nated countries in Central America, the Caribbean and North and
South America.
The overall objective of the CBI is to encourage economic devel-
opment and thereby foster political and social stability in the region.
Its major goals are: (1) to increase trade, (2) to increase private sector
investment in non-traditional sectors, thereby diversifying the eco-
nomic basis of the beneficiary countries, and (3) to encourage host
country governments to adopt the reforms necessary which create
business environments essential to attract and hold long-term capital
investment.
In the first few years following entry into force of the CBI, total
Caribbean basin country exports to the United States actually de-
clined from 8.9 billion to 6.1 billion from 1983 to 1986, due to the
crash in petroleum prices that substantially affected the export earn-
ings of Trinidad, Tobago, the Netherlands Antilles, and the Bahamas.
Nevertheless, the goals of the CBI began to be realized as non-tradi-
tional exports to the United States increased in the period 1983 to
1991 by over 150%. The CBI countries have reduced their depen-
dence on exports of petroleum to only 20% of their total exports
while increasing exports of non-traditional products to over 60% of
total exports this year. The development of new industries and ex-
panded production in the CBI countries has also resulted in a 68%
increase in United States exports to the region, to a total of $10.4
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billion in 1991. It is encouraging that many United States exports are
goods which add and/or contribute to the economic base, social infra-
structure and productive capacities of the CBI countries. A 1990
study by the United States Department of Commerce documented
789 new foreign direct investments in the beneficiary countries since
CBI was established in 1983. Those investments totalled $2.2 billion
in new assets in the region in projects which employ 142,000 full time
workers, and generate $1.3 billion annually in foreign exchange earn-
ings. None of this would have happened, or certainly this scale of
change would not have happened absent the CBI.
VII. ANDEAN TRADE INITIATIVE
The Andean Trade Initiative is a new program which was signed
into law under the Andean Trade Preference Act on December 4,
1991. This law resulted from the President's commitments at the
Drug Summit in Cartagena, Colombia in February 1990 and was in-
tended to help Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru in creating al-
ternative economic opportunities to the production, processing and
distribution of illegal drugs. In addition to encouraging economic al-
ternatives to drug trafficking, the Andean Trade Initiative is intended
to build on the momentum already evident in the Andean countries
and in the hemisphere toward the trade and investment liberalization
and economic reforms necessary to create business climates conducive
to foreign direct investment and further economic growth.
VIII. GATT
Before I conclude, I would like to give an overview of the current
state of play in the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, multilateral trade negotiations. The Uruguay
Round is the most ambitious trade negotiation ever undertaken, in-
volving 108 countries representing over 90% of total world trade. It
is the eighth round of trade liberalization negotiations to be under-
taken under the auspices of the GATT. The draft final act for the
round was issued on December 20, 1991 by GATT Director General
Arthur Dunkle. It covers all issues being negotiated in the round ex-
cept market access commitments in goods and services. In cases
where negotiating groups were unable to arrive at consensus, Director
General Dunkle proposed his own compromise solutions in the draft
final act. At the trade negotiations committee meeting on January 13,
1992, all delegations accepted the Dunkle draft as the basis for contin-
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uing negotiations. Dunkle outlined his plan to conclude the round in
a four track process - that is, negotiations and access for goods, ne-
gotiations and access for services, technical and legal drafting, and
refinements to specific tasks. His target is to complete the negotiation
by mid-April. Negotiations on market access commitments in goods
and services continue in Geneva, with the objective of meeting Dun-
kle's April target for concluding the round.
The United States is working to conclude the Uruguay Round
successfully. However, the United States has stated that no agree-
ment is better than an agreement that does not meet its high stan-
dards. The Dunkle draft will have to be evaluated in the context of
the entire package which includes the results of market access negoti-
ations in goods and services. By now this is going to sound familiar,
but our negotiating objectives in the Uruguay Round have been and
will continue to be to obtain real gains and market opportunities for
our exports of goods and services, including financial services; to sub-
stantially cut tariffs on goods and eliminate them entirely in key heav-
ily traded sectors; to achieve fundamental reform of world
agricultural trade; to obtain comprehensive and effective protection of
intellectual property rights; to insure that United States trade rules
and remedies continue to provide effective protection against unfair
trade practices and insure a swift and effective system of dispute
settlement.
Various observers have expressed concern that the United States
goals to negotiate free trade agreements with Canada and Mexico and
with all of the countries of the Western Hemisphere through the En-
terprise for the Americas Initiative, represents a weakening of the
United States' commitment to the multilateral trading system. Noth-
ing could be further from the truth. The United States remains firmly
committed to the multilateral trade system and to the successful con-
clusion of the Uruguay Round. Regional arrangements such as the
European Community; the European Free Trade Association, or
EFTA; the Australian/New Zealand Greater Cooperation Agree-
ment; the United States/Israel Free Trade Agreement; the United
States/Canada Free Trade Agreement; and potentially the NAFTA,
are permitted under GATT Article 24-6. In essence, that article al-
lows like-minded GATT countries to depart from the most-favored
nation principle in order to achieve greater and faster liberalization as
long as the agreement covers substantially all trade, and liberalizes
trade among the partner countries who allow new restrictions against
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imports from non-member countries. The CFTA meets those tests as
will NAFTA. Indeed, if one took the provisions of the GATT and
extended them out to their logical conclusions, one would get an
agreement that looked quite a bit like the United States/Canada Free
Trade Agreement.
IX. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this is an exciting time to be involved in trade in
the Western Hemisphere. The United States/Canada Free Trade
Agreement is a landmark achievement which is guiding the way for
others to growth through free trade and market oriented policies and
programs. As one free trade agreement takes root and its members
prosper, the example provides the momentum and gives the courage
to others to follow. For the United States, we see the changes taking
place in Mexico and its desire for a free trade agreement as an historic
window of opportunity, one that economics, geography, and history
compel us to pursue. A North American Free Trade Agreement of-
fers an unparalleled opportunity to capture the energies of our three
countries and three economies and propel us into the vanguard of
global competitiveness. Similarly, the Enterprise for the Americas In-
itiative, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the Andean Trade Initiative,
all reflect a continuing commitment of the United States to economic
growth through market opening and trade investment liberalizing pol-
icies. With the help and support of the American people and particu-
larly of the United States business community working in partnership
with the government we can realize the full economic potential of
trade and investment liberalization for the benefits of this and future
generations of our citizens.
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